The purpose of this article is to study the impact of agricultural policy decoupling on land allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of decoupling on farms' crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986) . Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the design of domestic agricultural policies in developed countries has given priority to methods that guarantee a price floor for agricultural commodities. Price support mechanisms can range from supply restrictions imposed on the domestic market, price subsidies, or public purchases of agricultural commodities to offset excess supply. A wide literature has shown that price support mechanisms may intensify production practices and bring about significant deadweight losses (Gardner, 1992) . The unfavourable consequences of agricultural protectionism became widely recognized by the 1980s. It became clear that agricultural intervention based on price guarantees and other market insulating policies led to overproduction, which in turn brought about market distortions and disagreements in multilateral trade policy negotiations. Recognition of these problems motivated multilateral and/or bilateral trade agreements that advocated for agricultural protectionism dismantling processes. In the framework of these agreements, different countries have reformed their domestic agricultural policies. Economic theory views lump sum transfers as the most efficient method to redistribute income among individuals (Williamson, 1996) . The trade-off between political pressures for continued support to farmers and the policymakers' will to reduce efficiency losses resulted in an increased use of decoupled agricultural policies. Decoupling is a term used to designate the break of the link between subsidies and production. Price supports are usually replaced by lump sum income transfers that do not depend on actual production or prices.
The conventional approach to the analysis of the effects of agricultural policies on farmers' profit maximization decisions has been to assume perfect markets (including credit markets), risk neutral producers and constant returns to scale. Under these assumptions, the literature has shown that the impacts of decoupled policies on production decisions are limited. However, if economic agents are not risk neutral, markets are imperfect, or returns to scale are other than constant, apparently decoupled payments could have more implications (see Phimister, 1995; Hennessy, 1998; or Rude, 2001) . A number of studies that have assessed economic agents' risk preferences have found evidence in favour of risk aversion (see, for example, Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Chavas and Pope, 1985; Pope and Just, 1991) . If uncertainty and risk preferences are introduced in the analysis of the impacts of decoupling, results suggest that apparently decoupled policies can influence production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Sandmo, 1971) . It is thus very important to account for risk and risk preferences when assessing the effects of decoupling.
When coupled or partially coupled, income supports often involve restrictive supply management rules that limit farmers' capacity to respond to market conditions. For example, eligibility for public subsidies is usually made conditional upon producing specific crops, the program crops. In this regard, decoupling involves increased planting flexibility in that direct payments are not tied to the production of certain commodities. Farmers being allowed more planting flexibility are likely to be more responsive to market conditions and alter their crop mix accordingly. To the extent that planting flexibility includes the possibility of agricultural land idling, farmers will also consider setting land aside when taking their decisions on land allocation.
There are yet other mechanisms through which the decoupling of agricultural policies can influence land allocation decisions. These mechanisms are the changes in relative market prices and farmers' risk attitudes. The reduction in price supports is likely to make program crops less attractive relative to non-program commodities and land idling. Also, to the extent that farmers' risk preferences are influenced by wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Just and Pope, 1978; Hennessy, 1998; Just and Zilberman, 1986) and to the extent that decoupled payments and price changes have the potential to affect the wealth of participant farmers, their willingness to assume risk may be altered. Because risk is a fundamental component of agricultural production and because yield variability can differ by crop type, government transfers might affect farms' land use by means of altering farmers' risk attitudes.
Decoupled agricultural payments were introduced in the United States (US) with the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, which involved a substantial change in the way income support was provided to farmers. With the FAIR Act, market price supports and deficiency payments were being partially replaced by Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) Payments whose amount and entitlement would not depend on actual production or prices, and a deficiency payment program that guaranteed a minimum support price for program crops including soybeans. While under the 1990 Act and with the exception of the flex acres, producers were required to plant the base acreage to the base crop in order to be eligible for deficiency payments, entitlement to receive PFC was based on qualified acres historically enrolled in commodity programs, allowing land to be put to any agricultural use, including the production of any crop with the exception of fruits and vegetables (unless it was used in this way in the past), or idled.
The purpose of this article is to study the impacts of decoupling on land allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of decoupling on farms' crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986) . We extend this model to study supply responses to decoupled payments and to include set aside among land use alternatives. Though various analyses have addressed the effects of decoupling on producers' decisions, no existing research has studied the impacts of decoupled payments on farms' land allocation using the extended Just and Zilberman (1986) 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The objective of our model is to assess the effects of decoupling on farm land allocation. We adopt Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under uncertainty. Because agricultural producers are not likely to be neutral to risk, farmers' risk preferences are explicitly considered. Our model defines risk preferences as a function of wealth (Just and Zilberman, 1986; Pope and Just, 1991; Hennessy, 1998) . If economic agents are risk averse and their risk adversity decreases with wealth (Pope and Just, 1991; Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman, 1997) , an increase in decoupled payments is expected to alter the crop mix towards more risky crops that offer higher expected margins. The reduction in price supports for program crops that characterizes a decoupling process will reduce the attractiveness of these crops in favour of non-program commodities and/or idle land. Apart from the substitution effects, a change in output prices will also have an income effect that, under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences, is likely to increase risk adversity.
The 1996 FAIR Act involved the introduction of decoupled payments that allowed, with some restrictions, full planting flexibility. We extend Just and Zilberman (1986) 
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It is assumed that farmers take their decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected utility of their wealth
, where W represents farms' total wealth, 0 W stands for farms' initial wealth, and G are decoupled income-support 1 Because for our sample of farms crop land remained almost constant during the period of analysis, A is assumed to be fixed.
payments. The quasi rent associated to idle land is assumed to be equal to zero.
Following previous literature, we assume risk neutrality in the input decision 2 which leads to independence of land allocation from variable input decisions (Just and Zilberman, 1986) . Under this assumption the first order conditions of the land allocation problem can be expressed as:
By approximating the marginal utility around the expected wealth
through a second-order Taylor series expansion, the first order conditions can be alternatively expressed as:
2 As Just and Zilberman note, the assumption of risk neutrality is very common in models with stochastic production and is necessary for the dual cost and production functions to be independent of risk preferences. This assumption allows to derive a theoretical framework that is more tractable at the empirical level. (1 )
, which represents onehalf the marginal variance of profit when 1 0 L = , i.e. at zero capacity allocation. In order to determine the effects of decoupling on land allocation decisions, we use comparative statics. The consideration of a multi-product land allocation problem involves substantial complexity relative to a more simplified two-product model and yields comparative statics formulae that cannot be signed. In order to make comparative statics more simple, but also more clear, we simplify the model to a consideration of only two alternatives in the land
3 It is important to note that model simplification is only limited to the comparative statics analysis in this section, and that the empirical implementation will be based upon the generalized threeproduct model.
Let's consider a land allocation problem that only includes program and non-program commodities. In such scenario the system of first-order conditions is reduced to:
(1 ) In order to assess the effects of decoupling on idle land, we now consider a model that studies the allocation of land among program crop production and set aside. In such a situation, the first order condition in (3) changes to (4) below:
Comparative statics allow to formulate the following two propositions:
PROPOSITION4. Idle land is reduced with an increase in decoupled payments.
This is due to the fact that an increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers' degree of risk aversion increasing their willingness to assume more risk. Given that idle land involves no risk, this alternative becomes less attractive in favour of producing agricultural commodities.
PROPOSITION5. For a negative value of the mean effect of production, idle land increases with an increase in 1 p to the detriment of 1 L . However, if the mean effect of production is positive, idle land only increases if the risk effect outweighs the mean effect.
In a situation where the mean effect of production is positive, farmers have the incentive to increase the amount of land allocated to program crops to the detriment of idle land, as long as the increase in production risk discounted to a certainty equivalent does not outweigh the mean effect. However, if the mean effect is negative, an increase in 1 p reduces program crop land in favour of idle land.
In summary, our comparative statics analysis shows that decoupled payments have the effect of reducing idle land. In contrast, the reduction in program crop price supports can motivate land set aside. Decoupled payments can also stimulate a change in crop mix in favour of non-program commodities.
This shift requires yields correlation to be negative or take low positive values. A decrease in program crop price supports can also boost non-program crops acreage under certain conditions. It is relevant to note that, with the exception of the influence of decoupled payments on idle land, the net effects of decoupling depend on issues such as yields correlation, changes in the variance of profit, or the magnitude of the mean and risk production effects. This impedes to anticipate the response to a decoupled program making it necessary to determine it empirically.
III. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
As explained above, our empirical application is focused on the analysis of the Retrospective data for these farms are also used to define some lagged variables used in the application. 4 The Kansas Farm Management Association database collects information from individual farms on an annual basis through a cooperative record-sharing, farm management, and tax preparation arrangement.
Around 2,500 full-time commercial holdings with gross sales exceeding $100,000 provide data to this database. Various farm types and areas in Kansas are represented in the dataset (Albright, 2001 wheat, corn and sorghum change, which complicates the definition of a reasonable value for 1 Π at the farm-level. In light of these problems, we define quasi rents using annual sample-means for the production and input consumption variables. Table 1 shows that, during the period studied, more than 62% of crop land was planted to program crops, a 26% was devoted to non-program commodities, being the rest left idle. Sample means also show that estimated PFC payments represent around 1.8% of farmers' initial wealth. Of interest is the fact that, for the period of analysis, the expected profit per acre derived from non-program commodities outweighs the one obtained by planting program crops. Also, during the period of study, 2 1 var var ( ) ( ) Π > Π , which involves higher income risk derived from non-program crops.
IV. RESULTS
9 Two-stage nonlinear least squares parameter estimates for the first-order conditions of the land allocation decision (see table   2 ) provide evidence that farmers in our sample are risk averse, and that the degree of risk aversion decreases with farmers' wealth, i.e., farmers exhibit DARA preferences. Price, cross-price and payment elasticities of the proportion of land planted to program and non-program crops or left idle are presented in table 3. As expected, results suggest that an increase in its own price will generate an increase in the quantity of land planted to program crops. Quite the opposite, the price elasticity of non-program crops is negative. This result is not surprising given the high income risk associated to 2 y during the period of
analysis. An increase in 2 p does not only involve an increase in mean income, but also a substantial increase in income variance. This lays out the necessary conditions for a failure in the 'law of supply', that contends that the quantity supplied by price-taking producers will rise in response to an increase in output
prices. An increase in profit risk above the increase in its mean will originate this failure. This result is in accord with the findings of Just and Zilberman (1986) . 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates the effects of decoupling on farmers' land allocation decisions and, specifically, on the crop mix and idle land. Coupled policies usually restrict farmers' capacity to respond to market conditions by imposing restrictive supply management rules. In this regard, decoupling involves increased planting flexibility and thus may motivate changes in land allocation.
Other aspects of decoupling can also influence land allocation decisions. These aspects are the reduction in price supports for program crops and their replacement by lump sum transfers, which are likely to involve changes in relative market prices and in farmers' risk attitudes.
In order to show how these policy reforms could affect land use, we use an extended version of the Just and Zilberman (1986) [ ] 
, land allocated to program crops will increase with an increase in decoupled payments
Proof of proposition 2. By totally differentiating equation (3), the following expression can be derived:
where ( )
represents the mean effect of production per unit of land, being Proof of proposition 4. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following expression can be derived:
Proof of proposition 5. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following expression can be derived: 
